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CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF THE REVISED
ILLINOIS RULES OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
INTRODUCTION

The topic of criminal discovery has engendered much controversy resulting in varied and distinguished debate. The battlefield of controversy has set the traditionalists, those who
oppose such a measure, against the more progressive faction,
those who feel such a measure would enhance the criminal trial.
Professor Wright analyzes the arguments on both sides and
concludes that, irrespective of their merits, the proponents of
discovery are gaining support with the courts.1 As evidence of
this proposition, Illinois enacted revised rules for criminal discovery on October 1, 1971.2 Under the auspices of the Illinois
Supreme Court, the defendant has gained more effective means
for discovering the prosecution's case. At the same time, however, he has paid a high price constitutionally because of increased prosecutorial discovery. By embodying in the rules the
proposition that criminal discovery must be a two-way street, the
Rules Committee has virtually stripped criminal defendants of
their constitutional protections guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
This article will analyze these guarantees and their application to
prosecutorial discovery in Illinois.
A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The unavailability of criminal discovery at English common
law was merely a concomitant of the generally restrictive policy
toward the rights of criminal defendants. Criminal discovery
was viewed as a measure without precedent and one which would
subvert the system of criminal justice.3 Late in the 18th century this attitude shifted and in England today legislation grants
the defendant an extended, thorough, preliminary hearing at
which each witness who is to testify for the Crown must divulge
4
all his information and be subject to defense cross-examination.
In essence, the defendant has nearly complete discovery while
the Crown has none.
Initially, both the courts and legislatures of this country
1 C. WRIGHT FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 252 (1969).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, PART B DISCOVERY (1971).

The discovery rules replace all prior statutory discovery in felony cases
after October 1, 1971. It should be stated that the prior statutory devices
are still available in misdemeanor cases. See ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PRACTICE
ch. 3A, 3A-3 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1972).
3 The King v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249 (K. B. 1792).
4 DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 108, 112-16 (1958).
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hesitated to follow England's lead. The courts' refusal was
surprising in light of John Marshall's pronouncement that discovery by the defendant was allied with the Sixth Amendment,
which guaranteed the right to compulsory process and the right
to prepare a defense. 5 Justice Cardozo epitomized conventional
thinking when he held that formal defense discovery could only
be granted in the most unusual and exigent circumstances, absent
remedial legislation.6 This attitude was based upon the fact that
nearly every state granted defendants limited statutory discovery
in the form of a right to procure a list of prosecution witnesses.!
It was thought that this limited right satisfied discovery needs
and manifested the intent of the legislature to fix the outer limits
of defense discovery.
As dissatisfaction with the American system of criminal
justice grew, so did the arguments in regard to increased defense
discovery. The opponents of criminal discovery argued that
disclosure of the prosecution's case would result in manufactured
evidence and perjury. 8 On the other side, proponents maintained
that this measure would not have the anticipated effect because
perjury could be committed even without discovery.9 Another
argument advanced against discovery was that the government's
sources of information would be inhibited because of unnecessary publicity and intimidation. 10 Advocates contended that only
the hardened criminal would indulge in such intimidation, which

could be accomplished without discovery and, even if there were
problems, protective orders offered a ready solution."
5 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (No. 14,692d)
1807):

A key

(Cir. Ct. Va.

On motion, prior to indictment, the defendant requested the court to

issue a subpoena duces tecum to the President so that a better material

to his defense could be proffered at trial.

In response to the prosecu-

tion's argument that the accused was not entitled to the court's aid in this

matter, Justice Marshall stated:
So far back as any knowledge of our jurisprudence is possessed, the
uniform practice of this country has been, to permit any individual,
who was charged with any crime, to prepare for his defence, and to
obtain the process of the court, for the purpose of enabling him so to
do. This practice is as convenient and as consonant to justice as it is
to humanity.

.

.

.

The right of an accused person to process of the

court to compel the attendance of witnesses seems to follow, necessarily, from the right to examine those witnesses; and, wherever the
right exists, it would be reasonable that it should be accompanied
with the means of rendering it effectual.
Id.

6 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84,
219 N.Y.S. 892 (1928).
7Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery - The New Illinois Rules,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, 589 [hereinafter cited as ZAGEL & CARR].
8 State v. Rhodes, 81 Ohio St. 397, 423-24, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
9 ZAGEL & CARR, sup'a note 7, at 561.
10 Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE
L.J. 674, 680-85 (1958).
11See Comment, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16,
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factor which militated against defense discovery was the undue
procedural advantage of surprise to the prosecution at trial because of earlier invocation of the Fifth Amendment. This aspect
of discovery was thought to be unfair in light of the existing advantages of the accused., I- The foregoing contention was rebutted
by pointing to the prosecutor's comparative advantages in investigative resources and abilities, the right to seize evidence, and
the grand jury. 1 The opponents further posited that the accused
himself controlled the most valuable source of information concerning the truth of the charges, and if he refused to speak, the
information remained unavailable to the state thereby rendering defense discovery unnecessary.The proponents answered
that such an assumption was unfounded because the accused is
presumed innocent and, therefore, presumed to have no knowledge of the crime.1" Finally, proponents of defense discovery
urged that since civil defendants are granted this measure with
relatively little at stake, there should be a parity in their criminal
counterparts when life or liberty is jeopardized. 6
Despite the apparent balance of these arguments, defense
discovery developed and expanded primarily because of dissatisfaction with the criminal process. 7 This evolution was facilitated by the assumption that defense discovery was a step toward
improvement of the system, and even if it failed, there could
hardly be further depreciation of the existing system. 18 The
increasing liberality of defense discovery brought a demand that
discovery be made a two-way street, and some states reacted by
allowing the prosecutor to discover certain aspects of the defendant's case.'
Illinois was not unaffected by the national trend for enlarging the scope of prosecutorial criminal discovery. Prior to the
adoption of the revised Supreme Court Rules, the major distinction between Illinois and other states was that Illinois was relatively liberal in affording discovery to both adversaries. By
statute, both the defense and prosecution were granted limited
pre-trial discovery and the former also had supplemental meth85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1011-22 (1972); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:

Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH. V.L.Q. 279 [hereinafter
cited as BRENNAN].
12 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (1923)
see States v.
June, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953).

13 Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantages in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1185-92 (1959-60) [hereinafter cited
as GOLDSTEIN].
14 Brennan, supra note 11, at 287.
15

Id.

& CARR, supra note 7, at 560.
17 See generally Goldstein, supra note 13.
16 ZAGEL

18 ZAGEL & CARR, supra note 7, at 573.

19 Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d
919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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ods available to aggrandize the statutory scheme.2 0 The major
difficulty with Illinois practice was the inconsistency with which
the courts of the various circuits and districts exercised discretion in granting discovery. This discretion and consequent lack
of uniformity created great disparities in the amount of material
available to both parties. 2 1 In sum, the prior Illinois practice was
uncertain and thus, codification was necessary. The immediate
impetus for this codification and expansion was the case of
2
People v. CrawfordY.
In response to the state's arguments,'-3
the Illinois Supreme Court exercised its inherent rule making
power and appointed a committee to draft discovery rules. The
result of this committee's efforts on behalf of the prosecution is
embodied in Rules 413 and 415 (g).
A complete analysis of every fallacy and weakness inherent
in the new rules will not be attempted. However, any difficulties
encountered in such an endeavor would be minuscule when compared to the Herculean constitutional problems confronting the
state when it utilizes Rules 413 and 415 (g).
THE NEW RULES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The most eloquent indictment of prosecutorial discovery generally and one which is appropriate to the Illinois rules is that
contained in the dissenting opinion in Williams v. Florida.24
Justice Black poignantly described the effect of prosecutorial discovery by stating:
[T]he decision opens the way for a profound change in one of the
most important traditional safeguards of a criminal defendant.
. . . The theory advanced goes at least so far as to permit the
State to obtain under threat of sanction complete disclosure by the
defendant in advance of trial of all evidence, testimony, and tactics he plans to use at that trial. . .
These cases are sufficient
evidence of the inch-by-inch, case-by-case process by which the
rationale of today's decision can be used to transform radically our
system of criminal justice into a process requiring the defendant
20 See Gramenos, Investigation and Discovery in a Criminal Case, 49
CHI. B. REV. 386 (1968); ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PRACTICE (Illinois Institute
for Continuing Legal Education), Library of Congress no. 7B-163192,
ch. 4 (1972).
21 People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 483
(1969).
On oral argument the State pointed out that within a single circuit some
judges were granting discovery of the State's entire file while other judges
were denying discovery as an item by item basis.
22

Id.

23 ZAGEL & CARR, supra note 7, at 576.

After the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the
trial court had inherent power to grant discovery, the State appealed to
the Supreme Court of Illinois. On appeal the State did not resist discovery
but requested uniform rules so that inconsistencies could be eliminated
throughout the various circuits.
The state asked the supreme court to
exercise rule making power so that uniform rules could be established in
order to eliminate the inconsistencies of a case by case development.
24 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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to assist the State in convicting him, or be punished for failing to
25
do so.

Justice Black's prophecy is embodied in Rule 413 (c) and (d).
Rule 413 (c) allows the state to discover, on written motion,
"reports or results, or testimony relative thereto, of physical
or mental examinations or of scientific tests ... or comparisons,
or any other reports or statements of experts ... .2 If the
defendant does not intend to use these reports at trial, his
statement therein may be excised, but otherwise they remain
fully discoverable.27 It should be noted that the reports themselves are always discoverable, whether or not the accused intends

to use them at trial.

Pursuant to Rule 413(d), the defense is

required to notify the state of any affirmative or nonaffirmative

defenses he intends to use at trial. 2

As part of this scheme,

the state is entitled to:
[t]he names and last known addresses of persons he intends to
call as witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded
statements, including memoranda reporting or summarizing their
oral statements .. .and .. .any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects he intends to use as evidence or for
impeachment ...

29

In order to determine the viability of a Fifth Amendment
attack on the citadel of Rule 413, the following considerations

must be examined: (1) whether discovery by the prosecution is
within the historical purview of those interests which the Fifth
Amendment was designed to protect; (2) whether the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to evidentiary production as contem22ld. at 114-15.
26 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 413(c) (1971) provides:
Medical and scientific reports. Subject to constitutional limitations, the
trial court shall, on written motion, require that the State be informed
of, and permitted to inspect and copy or photograph, any reports or
results, or testimony relative thereto, of physical or mental examinations
or of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other reports
or statements of experts which defense counsel has in his possession or
control, except that those portions of reports containing statements made
by the defendant may be withheld if defense counsel does not intend to
use any of the material contained in the report at a hearing or trial.
(emphasis added).
27 ZAGEL &C ARR, supra note 7, at 583.
28
1ILL.

Rnv.

STAT.

ch. 110A, § 413(d) (1971) provides:

(d) Defenses. Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time after the filing of a written motion by the State,
defense counsel shall inform the State of any defenses which he
intends to make at a hearing or trial and shall furnish the State
with the following material and information within his possession
or control:
(i) The names and last known addresses of persons he intends to
call as witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements, including memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements, any record of prior criminal convictions known to him; and
(ii) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects
he intends to use as evidence or for impeachment at a hearing
or trial.
29

Id.
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plated by the rule; and (3) whether the state's interests in
discovery are sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into the
defendant's privilege.
The answer to the first consideration can be found by examining the historical development of the Fifth Amendment.
The privilege against self-incrimination developed closely with
the political and religious disputes of early England.30 Prior
to the early 1200's, ecclesiastical judges ex officio would summon
an individual into court, utilize an inquisitorial oath, and force
him to respond to broad inquiries into his affairs.3 1 While this
procedure could only be employed if there was some presentation
of a charge, no regard was given to the nature or strength of
the accusations. 2 The Court of Star Chamber employed a
similar oath, but this body was not even limited by the requirement of some presentation of a charge and, consequently, opposition to the oath reached its apogee with this tribunal. 33 The
use of self-incrimination was not endemic to the foregoing tribunals and in criminal trials the accused, not under oath, was
expected to take an active part in the proceedings.3 ' In sum,
irrespective of the use of an oath or a presentation, the accused
could be made to participate in the proceedings and this mandate
3 5
could be enforced by torture.
While there is disagreement as to whether the privilege was
designed to protect the abuse of the oath, lack of presentation of
a charge, extraction of information from the accused, or a combination of the foregoing, the common law courts finally accepted
the principle that it was improper to compel the accused to
respond to any interrogation whatever.3 6 The historical background of the privilege indicates an objection to the use of
testimonial information extracted from the accused as the basis
for a criminal proceeding.3 7
Present day prosecutorial discovery offends several historical interests protected by the Fifth Amendment. While the
danger of torture is almost nonexistent, modern society is likely
30 GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955)
as GRISWOLD].

[hereinafter cited

31 MAGUIRE, ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF

CHARLES HOWARD METHWAIN ch. VII, attack of the Common Lawyers on

the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Court in England,
199 (Cambridge ed. 1936).
328 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 225g at 277 (McNaughton

[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].

rev. ed. 1961)

83Id. at 278.
34 Id. at 289.
35 GRISWOLD, supra note 30, at 3.
36 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 241 (2d ed. 1972)
inafter cited as MCCORMICK].
7

Id.

[here-
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to view incarceration for contempt or preclusion from presenting
8
a defense as its equivalent.3
Another interest invaded by prosecutorial discovery is the
defendant's right to be free from unwarranted, wholesale intrusions upon his privacy. 39 These invasions would result because prosecutorial discovery is only available following an indictment or the filing of an information. 40 This aspect of the rules
creates an incentive for the state to initiate proceedings with

unreliable evidence that would not be sufficient to sustain a
conviction, but which would suffice for a finding of probable
cause. 1 The quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a finding
of probable cause makes it likely that the accused would be
brought to a stage in the criminal process where discovery would
be available to the state and the prosecutor could then procure
from the accused the evidence necessary for a conviction. This

process is reminiscent of the exploratory searches undertaken by
the Court of Star Chamber and similarly would result in the

same unjustified, deplorable intrusions of privacy. If the state
had no discovery available, there would be a greater likelihood
that more reliable evidence would be gathered .inorder to avoid
the unnecessary waste involved in commencing a prosecution

where there is a minimal possibility of conviction.

If, after its

investigation, the state decided not to proceed, the accused would
be spared the unjustified invasion of his privacy which attends
his appearance before a magistrate or a grand jury. On the

other hand, if the state proceeded, there would be justification for
the incidental invasion of privacy.

A third interest violated by prosecutorial discovery is "the

42
intrinsic importance and dignity of the individual."'

Compul-

38Id. at 251.

39 Comment, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 994, 999 (1972) ; see Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1949).
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 411 (1971) provides: "that the rules shall

be available following an indictment or the filing of an information and not
in the course of any preliminary hearing."
41 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 1166-69.
According to the author most magistrates look only for some legally
competent evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause at this preliminary
hearing. It must be kept in mind that the accused has no constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing; and whatever efficacy it may have in maintaining an accusatorial system can be lost if the State returns an indictment
with a full information of the charge . See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7; People
v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 557, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967).
The accused is afforded no protection by the grand jury, whether he is
bound over after preliminary hearing or initially charged by indictment
because, in effect, this body is a rubber stamp for the prosecution. The
same weak evidence that will suffice before a magistrate will satisfy the
grand jury and thus the accused will surely reach the stage when discovery
is available. For an interesting discussion of the demerits of the grand
jury see Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 423, 431-33.
42

GRISWOLD,

supra note 30, at 7.
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sory self-incrimination confronts the accused with the dilemma
of being punished whether he lies or tells the truth.4 3 This results in an affront to his personal dignity. Discovery by the
prosecution, with its concomitant sanctions for noncompliance,
squarely presents the accused with a dilemma in that he will
4
suffer irrespective of obedience to the state's command.
Finally, the Fifth Amendment privilege has established the
4
preferred position of the accused when confronted by the state. 1
By equalizing the position of the lone suspect, the privilege tends
to balance the advantages. Discovery by the prosecution tends
to upset the balance by adding to the state's already superior
investigating power, tactical advantages, and financial resources.
Defense discovery cannot redress this disparity because in many
cases it affords only minimal advantages.4 6 The prosecution may
43 United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 591 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
44 If the defendant disgorged the necessary evidence he may be convicted.
If he fails to comply he could be prevented from introducing this evidence
in support of his defense or otherwise punished. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, § 415(g) (1970).
45 GRISWOLD, supra note 30, at 8.
46ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(A)
(i) (1971) provides:
RuLE 412: DISCLOSURE TO AccusED
(a) Except as is otherwise provided in these rules as to matters not
subject to disclosure and protective orders, the State shall, upon
written motion of defense counsel, disclose to defense counsel the
following material and information within its possession or control:
(i) The names and last known addresses of persons whom the
State intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements, memoranda containing substantially verbatim reports of their oral statements, and a list
of memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements.
Upon written motion of defense counsel memoranda reporting
or summarizing oral statements shall be examined by the court
in camera and if found to be substantially verbatim reports
or oral statements shall be disclosed to defense counsel. (emphasis added).
The defendant may have no more than a right to discovery for the
following reasons:
A. Section 412 (i) provides for denial of disclosure to the accused:
(i) Denial of disclosure. The court may deny disclosure authorized
by this rule and Rule 413 if it finds that there is a substantial
risk to any person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery,
economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment resulting from such disclosure which outweighs any
usefulness of the disclosure to counsel.
B.
The witnesses may properly refuse to speak to the accused and this
is most likely if they are closely allied with the prosecution. Section 415(a) provides in part:
(i) [N]either the counsel for the parties nor other prosecution or
defense personnel shall advise persons having relevant material or information (except the accused) to refrain from
discussing the case with the opposing counsel or showing opposing counsel any relevant material, nor shall they otherwise
impede opposing counsel's investigation of the case.
Witnesses have a right not to cooperate as long as this non-cooperation is not instigated by the prosecution. Gregory v. U.S., 369 F.2d
185 (1966). The witnesses are under no obligation to grant interviews or to discuss the testimony unless they choose to do so.
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be in the same position, but their existing advantages allow
them to more adequately effectuate whatever discovery they gain.

Since the scope of the privilege does not coincide with the
"complex of values it helps to protect," 4 1 inquiry cannot cease
merely because prosecutorial discovery violates protected historical interests. It must therefore be determined whether the
evidentiary production required by Rule 413 meets the standards

of the Fifth Amendment protection.

The phrase "No person

• . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself" 48 has been interpreted to include only legal
compulsion4 9 whereby incriminating evidence 50 of a testimonial

or communicative nature is procuredJ1 Statements, including
conduct equivalent thereto,52 are testimonial or communicative
when their relevance depends upon truth content. 3

A state-

ment will be used as evidence of its truth when the accused is
required to communicate consciousness and knowledge of facts,
so that the state must rely on his moral responsibility for telling
the truth.5 4 Succinctly stated, there must be a revelation of the
cognitive processes of the accused so that the evidence derives
its value from his credibility. 5
In order to apply this definition to the fruits of discovery

C.

People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 103 N.E. 1043 (1914). Also ZAGEL
& CARR at 591.
There may be no written or recorded statements of witnesses. The
former items may not be available simply because the witnesses
have not written anything or they may have been advised not
to do so. In regard to the latter items no statute or case law
requires that a transcript of preliminary be furnished to the accused free of charge. People v. Givans, 83 Ill. App. 2d 423, 228
N.E. 123, 125 (1967). Also, the grand jury testimony of witnesses
may not*be recorded because of the lack of equipment. ZAGEL &
CARR at 579.

D.

Memoranda may not be substantially verbatim because of the inaccurate methods of police reporting. Also, the statements may
not be put in memoranda form by agencies other than the police
or if they are the above requirement is not satisfied here either.
ZAGEL & CARR at 597.
From the foregoing it seems apparent that defense discovery may be more
theoretical than practical.
47 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49 8 WIGMORE at 401.
50 Id. at 369-78.

51 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
52 Id. at 763, 767.
The court rejected Wigmore's view that the privilege applied only to
words spoken out of the accused's mouth. In regard to discovery, the accused may be required to do more than list witnesses or evidence he will
use. He may be required to actually produce certain items of evidence; this
could be classified as conduct which is equivalent to a statement. See
MCCORMICK at 596, where the author refers to this type of conduct as
assertive.
53See McCORMICK at 584. This is the definition of hearsay used by
the author.
54 See 8 WIGMORE at 379.

55 Comment, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV.
L. RE V. 994, 1002 (1972).
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under Rule 413 (c) and (d), the evidence subject to the rule must
be re-examined. Pursuant to Rule 413 (c), the accused may be
required to produce various test results and experts' reports. 6
Rule 413(d) (i) requires the accused to produce the names and
addresses of witnesses in support of his defense (s).11 As part
of 413 (d), subsection (ii) makes it mandatory to disgorge books,
papers, photographs, documents and tangible evidence which
58
will be introduced to support the defense.
Compliance under 413 (c) is testimonial whether or not the
items produced contain statements of the accused. At a minimum, there is testimonial disclosure implicit in production because the accused is authenticating preexisting documents" and
informing the prosecutor that such items have relevance to the
case. 60 In addition, disclosure is testimonial because the accused
is informing the prosecution of the existence and location of the
items sought."' It would seem that the state implicitly admits its
ignorance of these facts merely by seeking discovery because,
were it otherwise, they could procure the items by means of a
search warrant.62
Discovery pursuant to Rule 413(d) (i) and
(ii) follows the identical rationale underlying 413(c), except
that disclosure in compliance with 413 (d) (i) is testimonial for
the additional reason that the accused is labeling the witness as
a person familiar with the defendant's activities at particular
times.8 3
Restated, disclosure in accordance with Rule 413(c) and
(d) is testimonial because it involves a communication from the
defendant to the prosecutor, the veracity of which depends on
the accused's credibility.
In addition to being testimonial or communicative, produc56 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

57M. § 413(d) (i).
58 Id. § 413(d) (ii).
5 8 WIGMORE at
60

110A, § 413(c) (1971).

380.

Comment, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv.

L. REv. 994, 1004 (1972).
61 See note 19, supra.
62 Comment, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 994, 1004 (1972).
63 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
In this case a statute
requiring motorists involved in an accident to stop and identify themselves
was upheld against a Fifth Amendment attack. Four of the majority felt
that the "stop" requirement was not testimonial on authority of United

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 215 (1967).

The remaining justices, including

Justice Harlan who upheld the statute on other grounds, felt that the act
of stopping was testimonial because it amounted to an admission by the
accused.

They properly distinguished Wade because in that case the police

already suspected the accused of the crime and his appearance in the line-up
added nothing to their knowledge. In Byers, the act of identification revealed to the authorities the name of a suspect previously unknown. To
the extent that the reasoning of the remaining five justices prevails, the
act of identification required by Rule 413(d) (ii) would be testimonial
because the accused would be adding to the knowledge of the police by
informing them that certain persons are familiar with his activities.

374

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 7:364

tion under the rules is almost certain to be incriminating. Proponents of prosecutorial discovery contend that compliance
with the rules requires the defendant to identify evidence he
intends to use at trial, and therefore, it is highly unlikely that
such evidence will be incriminating. An examination of Rule
413 (c) indicates that production is not limited to items the defendant intends to introduce at trial. 64 The fact that the accused
chooses not to use this evidence in support of his case is indicative of the fact that it may be incriminating. Even if production under Rule 413(c) and (d) initially revealed only
exculpatory matter, this evidence could be damaging because it
may provide leads to a source of evidence that might be used 5
66
or a link in the chain of proof necessary for conviction.
Further consideration of the rules will demonstrate that
the use of the word "intends" as a talisman for constitutionality
is unfounded. The accused may intend to call a witness whose
testimony is totally exculpatory, but it does not necessarily
follow that such testimony will retain its initial character when
finally introduced at trial. The defendant can never predict how
this testimony will be adduced when finally exposed to questioning and cross-examination by the prosecution. In other situations,
the accused may not know what evidence he intends to introduce
until either the state has sustained its burden of proof or other
issues have resolved at trial. Accelerated disclosure, coupled
with sanctions for noncompliance, forces a defendant to reveal
possibly incriminating evidence in order to preserve his right to
introduce this same evidence at trial. Analysis of this situation
with respect to various types of evidence effectively illustrates
the defendant's dilemma.
Evidence may be exculpatory on one element of a crime, but
incriminating on another. For example, a witness may testify
that the defendant killed the victim, but that he did so in selfdefense. Normally, the defendant would not introduce this evidence until the state had proved that he committed the crime.
By forcing disclosure prior to trial, the state is provided with
incriminating evidence. The results are identical if experts' reports, documents, photographs or tangible evidence supportive
of a defense are disclosed prior to trial.6
Other evidence may be exculpatory or incriminating concerning one element of a crime, depending on the resolution of
64
See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra.
65 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 569 (1892), rev'd on other
grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
60 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
67 Some examples to illustrate the point follow:
A. Expert reports - In a murder trial the accused has a report of a
doctor who treated him after the killing. In the report the ac-
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certain issues at trial. For example, the effect of a document,
witness, photograph or expert report placing the defendant in a
particular location at a certain time might depend on resolution
of conflicting theories as to when the crime was committed.
Ordinarily, the defendant would not reveal such evidence until
the state proved when the crime occurred. Forced disclosure
would prematurely provide the state with potentially incriminating evidence.
While it is true that not all evidence in the foregoing discussion would be incriminating, any determination of its inculpatory
character could not be made until after the state's case in chief.
Therefore, the need for a rule denying all such discovery is obvious.
Conceivably, the incriminating effect of all discovery as
heretofore discussed could be mitigated by limiting the use of
such evidence. In other words, the state would only be permitted to use this evidence for impeachment or rebuttal. The
efficacy of this solution is doubtful as it would necessarily rely
heavily on the use of appropriate jury instructions. Any solution involving such instructions would be more theoretical than
real, for in all likelihood the jury would consider the evidence
on the issue of guilt. 6 A second possible solution would be
to limit the use of the evidence to the state's case in chief if
such evidence were not a fruit of discovery 9 To be effective,
this proposal would require constant judicial intervention which
in turn would negate the effect of discovery as a time and prob70
lem saving device.
Even though evidence is testimonial and incriminating, the
Fifth Amendment will be applicable only if there is some legal
compulsion directed toward the defendant to produce this evidence. Once again, it is necessary to discuss the effect of the
word "intends" as used in the Illinois Rules. The Supreme Court
cused has admitted the crime but told the doctor he was injured defending himself against an attack by the deceased.
B. Photograph - In a trial for reckless homicide the accused has a
photograph which tends to show he was in an accident but which
also demonstrates that he was not at fault.
C. Tangible evidence - In a trial for murder the accused has a
blood stained shirt which he wore when the crime was committed.
This shirt contains his blood and the deceased's. This item of
evidence may be relevant to prove self defense.
66 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
69 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
70 Doherty, Total Pretrial Disclosures to the State: A Requiem to the
Accusatorial System, 60 ILL. B.J. 534 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DOHERTY].
In this article Mr. Doherty points out that prosecutorial discovery will cause
more problems than it will solve. Perhaps the constant judicial intervention
was one of these problems. See Strayhorn, 56 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 279 (1973).
In the article Judge Strayhorn views discovery as a time saving device but
judicial intervention whenever the prosecutor discovers evidence would certainly militate against this feature.
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in Williams v. Florida'1 held that because the defendant is required to reveal only evidence he intends to introduce at trial,
accelerated disclosure deprives him only of time and not of
rights. The Court justified this dogma by analogizing the defendant's pre-trial choice - to open a source of potentially incriminating evidence or to be precluded from doing so - with
72
the choice he must face at trial.
Through Justice White, the Court based its reasoning on an
analysis of the Fifth Amendment in light of its purpose. Traditionally, it was stated that the accused had an absolute right
to silence until the prosecution had made out a prima facie case
against him. 73 This pronouncement, however, was not borne out
by judicial decision because the protection was dealt with only
in terms of the accused taking the stand 74 and the permissible
inferences which could be drawn from his failure to do so.T5
If the accused were granted a pretrial absolute privilege not
to disclose the evidence he would eventually reveal at trial,
the Fifth Amendment would merely afford an opportunity to
surprise the prosecution.'
Even if the defendant were afforded the more limited right of a witness, the right not to be
compelled to give incriminating responses, the effect would be
identical. The privilege would still be absolute because any
pretrial statement could be incriminating. 77 The procedural
advantage of surprise at trial would militate against the concept
of a criminal trial as "[a] search for the truth.

' 78

The accused

has no constitutionally protected right to denigrate a trial and,
therefore, the Fifth Amendment cannot be used as a vehicle to
carry out this purpose.
While the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is
hardly open to question, it is based upon the assumption that an
accused will eventually introduce at trial the evidence which is
subject to accelerated disclosure. This assumption can never be
reduced to a certainty, but the Court was concerned with a
lesser standard. The majority, in effect, held that if the election
the accused must make prior to trial - either to open a source
of potentially incriminating evidence or to be foreclosed from
doing so - is the same as the choice he must face at trial, then
71 Wilder, Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 3, 17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WILDERI.
72 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970).
73 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1962).
74 United States v. Housing Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665
(3d Cir. 1949).
75Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
76 Wilder, supra note 71, at 15.
71 Cases cited notes 65 and 66 supra.
78 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1962).
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the assumption would be justified. Justice White concluded that
the choice was identical. Herein lies the weakness of his logic
as evidenced by the Court's subsequent decision in Brooks v.
Tennessee.7°
In Brooks the Court struck down a state statute which
required the accused to testify, if at all, prior to other defense
witnesses, concluding that the accelerated disclosure embodied
in the statute was an impermissible restriction on the defendant's
right against self-incrimination.8° In reaching this result the
Court examined the interplay of two factors: (1) consequence
of the accused's choice to testify and (2) the point at trial
when this choice was required by statute. The defendant's decision to testify risks the admission of impeachment evidence
otherwise impermissible and serious consequences in cross-examination."1 Each poses a threat to a successful defense. The Tennessee statute requiring the accused to testify immediately after
the state's case in chief confronted the defendant with a decision
involving much uncertainty in predicting the strength of his
evidence. 2
Justice Brennan recognized this dilemma when he stated:
Although a defendant will usually have some idea of the strength
of his evidence, he cannot be absolutely certain that his witnesses
will testify as expected or that they will be effective on the stand.
They may collapse under skillful and persistent cross-examination,
and through no fault of their own they may fail to impress the
jury as honest and reliable witnesses.83
Since the strength of his case is a determinative factor in
the accused's choice, he cannot make an enlightened judgment
until he is relatively certain of the impact of his defense. This
certainty will be manifest only after his witnesses have testified
and have been exposed to cross-examination. Therefore, the
defendant can adequately weigh the pros and cons of his decision
only after the time specified by the statute. The thrust of the
Court's decision was that while accelerated disclosure enables the
accused to make his choice, he is not in a position to make as
realistic or as intelligent an evaluation as he would be after other
events occurred at trial. The vagaries and uncertainties thrust
upon the accused by accelerated disclosure deprived him of
rigkts, forcing him to disclose testimony he might otherwise not
have revealed had he been afforded an adequate opportunity to
19 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
BoId. at 611.
81Id. at 609. In this regard see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), which approved the use of confessions obtained in violation of
Miranda for use as impeachment.
82 406 U.S. at 609.
83 Id.
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evaluate his decision at a later time. The weakness of Justice
White's reasoning in Williams becomes palpable when the accelerated disclosure mandated by Rule 415(g)" 4 is examined in
light of Brooks.
The consequence of the accused's choice to reveal a defense
is equally deleterious to its success because disclosure provides
an opportunity for the prosecution to gather rebuttal witnesses.
Illinois does not allow defense discovery of these witnesses and
thus the accused runs a substantial risk of having every piece
of evidence refuted at trial.1' The Illinois scheme does not afford
the accused the same opportunity to make an informed judgment
concerning disclosure as he would be afforded at trial. By testing the strength of the state's case through a motion for a directed verdict, the at-trial choice allows the accused an opportunity to ascertain whether or not the state has sustained its
heavy burden of proof. Even if his motion is denied, the accused
is relatively certain that he must introduce his evidence. Prior
to trial, the accused only knows what the strength of the state's
evidence might be and he can never be certain that the state will
sustain its burden. This position is borne out by Justice Black's
dissent in Williams v. Florida:
When a defendant is required to indicate whether he might
plead alibi in advance of trial, he faces a vastly different decision
from that faced by one who can wait until the State has presented
the case against him before making up his mind. Before trial
the defendant knows only what the State's case might be. Before
trial there is no such thing as the 'strength of the State's case';
there is only a range of possible cases. At that time there is no
certainty as to what kind of case the State will ultimately be able
to prove at trial. Therefore any appraisal of the desirability of
pleading alibi will be beset with guesswork and gambling far
greater than that accompanying the decision at the trial itself. Any
lawyer who has actually tried a case knows that, regardless of the
amount of pretrial preparation, a case looks far different when it is
actually being tried than when it is only being thought about. 86
The state's burden of proof is a determinative factor in the ac84

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 4 1 5(g)

(g) Sanctions.

(1971) provides:

(i) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued
pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit
the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, exclude such evidence, or enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(ii) Wilful violation by counsel of an applicable discovery rule or

an order issued pursuant thereto may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the court.

85 Doherty, supra note 70, at 546; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412
(a) (i) (Smith-Hurd 1971) Committee Comments and ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

38, § 114-9 (c) (1971).
86 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 109 (1970)

(Black, J., dissenting).
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cused's choice to reveal a defense. It is conceivable that he
would introduce no evidence if the state failed in its burden, but
it is certain he would not introduce evidence with both exculpatory and incriminating characteristics. Thus, by accelerating
disclosure to an earlier time, the accused is forced to reveal evidence he might not disclose if he had an adequate opportunity to
evaluate the state's evidence at trial. This consequence indicates
that the accused is being deprived of rights, and not merely of
time or procedural advantage.
This analysis of prosecutorial discovery leads to the conclusion that an accused is deprived of rights and, therefore, the
Fifth Amendment protection is applicable. The question of
whether he is afforded the more limited protection of a witness
or the traditional right of the accused at trial, is academic. In
either case, the privilege is absolute. Even the most ardent opponents of prosecutorial discovery might resist this application
of the Fifth Amendment privilege because of a fear of surprise
at trial. Even though surprise at trial may be a necessary
incident of the absolute privilege, the state can surely protect
itself adequately by means other than the present discovery rules.
These means will be discussed later in this article.
But surprise is only one factor which may detract from the
desired objectives of a criminal trial. Another possibility for
abuse occurs when a witness or a defendant is afforded an opportunity to adapt his testimony "to meet the necessities as laid
open by prior witnesses .
-. 87 This latter evil was relied on
to justify the Tennessee statute at issue in Brooks. The state's
argument that accelerated disclosure assured honest testimony
and minimized the chances that a witness would adjust his
version of the facts to fit what others had said, was deemed
insufficient to overcome the defendant's Fifth Amendment
right. 8 If the Fifth Amendment protections are available prior to
trial, then the accused cannot suffer legal compulsion to reveal
evidence. The Supreme Court has defined compulsion in the
following terms:
[The accused has the right] to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty . . .for such silence.89
Rule 415(g) imposes a preclusion sanction on a defendant by
providing that a party may be deprived of the ability to present
evidence at trial by failure to comply with a discovery order.
In order to preserve his ability to introduce at trial, the accused
is forced to reveal the evidence prior to trial. The sanction thus
87 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 607 (1972).
88 Id.

at 612.
89Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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operates on his free will by exacting a penalty for noncompliance. Therefore, the preclusion sanction provides the necessary
legal compulsion to complete the trilogy of elements comprising
the basis of the Fifth Amendment protection.
Since the Fifth Amendment is applicable to prosecutorial

discovery, it is necessary to consider whether the state's interests
in preventing surprise at trial, diminishing the possibility of
perjury and reducing the trial load, outweigh the constitutional
interests of the accused.9 0 In order to prevail, the state's in-

terests must be urgent and discovery must be the only viable
91
means of fulfillment.
First, preventing surprise at trial is a legitimate state interest because it enhances the prosecutor's ability to present his
case. The element of surprise could be dealt with in an equally

effective manner by granting the state a continuance at trial.
The disadvantage of disrupting the trial process is slight when
compared to constitutional interests of the accused. Also, more
effective use of the state's vast investigative resources would
significantly mitigate the evil of surprise. Other proposals for

increasing the prosecutor's access to information include both a
motion for a bill of particulars 92 and pre-trial conferences. 9 An90 Comment, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 994, 1008, 1010 (1972), Comment, The Preclusion Sanction - A
Violation of the Constitutional Right To Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J.
1342, 1353 (1972).
In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the plurality, consisting of
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Stewart, and Blackmun, balanced
the state's interests against those of the individual within the framework
of a discussion of the attenuated risk of incrimination. 402 U.S. 427-31.
Justice Harlan, who provided the swing vote, confronted the balancing issue
directly. He saw the statutorily required disclosure as protected by the
privilege as a definitional matter; but he thought the state statutory goals
so paramount as to preclude applicability of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
434-58.
The Court has been less willing to consider countervailing state interests
where they have been in areas traditionally controlled by the criminal law.
See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) ; Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968) (both involving the control of gambling). In Byers,
both the plurality and Justice Harlan relied on the fact that California's
interest in providing compensation for victims of automobile accidents is of
a noncriminal nature. See 402 U.S. at 429-31, 458. Such a distinction is
reasonable; it is easier to assert that the authors of the Fifth Amendment
have already structured a balance of interests when the state's interest is
enforcement of its criminal laws.
The state interests of preventing surprise at trial, minimizing the
likelihood of perjury and reducing the trial load lie somewhere in the middle
of the criminal/non-criminal spectrum. They are not directly related to the
control of a particular crime as are laws which control gambling, but they
do relate to the control of crime generally by providing the prosecutor with
a better opportunity to secure convictions.
91 Comment, The Preclusion Sanction A Violation of the Constitutional Right To Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342, 1353 (1972).
92 Millar, The Function of Criminal Pleading, 12 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L.C. 500, 503 (1922).
93 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 states:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the court
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other alternative involves statutes based on reciprocal discovery.
Such statutes pass constitutional muster because discovery by
the defense constitutes a waiver of his privilege 94 and only
permits the accused an opportunity to discover after he consents
to a mutual opportunity in the prosecution. Reciprocal discovery
has been criticized, 5 but it is premised on a waiver of constitutional rights by the accused. The present Illinois rules are not
reciprocal. Each party can discover from the other without
regard to conditioning the right on the accused's consent.9 6 Furthermore, statutes providing for notice of a proposed defense
absent a list of witnesses or documents, would appear to mitigate the level of surprise at trial. Because these alternatives
are available to the state and are equally effective in reducing
surprise, present prosecutorial discovery under Illinois rules
cannot be so justified.
Second, the extent of the state's interest in preventing
perjury is proportional to the likelihood that false testimony will
be offered. Studies have demonstrated that the alibi defense is
subject to this evil. 7 The likelihood of perjury is increased in
the case of an alibi because of the relative ease with which the
defense can be fabricated and the difficulty of rebuttal 8 Defenses based on expert testimony and scientific experiment are
not as susceptible of fabrication in light of the professional
character of the witnesses involved. Defenses involving the use
of other witnesses or documents are also not as easily fabricated
and therefore the likelihood of perjury is reduced. With tangible evidence the danger of perjury is non-existent. It follows
that the state's interest in preventing perjury can be justified
only with respect to the alibi defense. Even though this interest
may be sufficiently urgent, the present scheme of discovery should
yield if the state can effectuate this interest by other means.
Studies of the alibi defense illustrate that perjury is reduced
where there is a statute requiring mere notice of the defense
without a list of witnesses.9 9 Further, statistics do not support
a conclusion that a list of witnesses has any greater effect in
upon motion of any party or upon its own motion may order one or
more conferences to consider such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial.
94See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
95 Smith and McCollom, Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth
Amendment Privileges Abridged, 54 A.B.A.J. 256 (1968).
96 ZAGEL & CARR, supra note 7, at 587.
9TMillar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedures, 11 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L.C. 344, 350-51 (1920) ; Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 29, 31 (1964) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN].
98 Stassen, Bench and Bar The Show Window of the Bar, 20 MINN. L.
Rgv. 577, 580-81 (1936); People v. Holiday, 47 Il1. 2d 300, 302, 265 N.E.2d
634, 635 (1970).
99

EPSTEIN,

supra note 97, at 35.
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reducing perjury than does mere notice.'
Since the state can
reduce the incidence of perjury by a statute requiring only notice, the portion of the Illinois rule requiring a list of witnesses
should be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
Finally, there is no indication that pre-trial discovery will
have the effect of reducing the trial load in overburdened
courts. 10 1 Whatever increase occurs in the state's dismissal rate
can be attributed to defendants who voluntarily come forward
and reveal totally exculpatory evidence. In such cases, discovery
by the state should be unnecessary. It is unlikely that discovery
would increase plea bargaining because the state already has
superior investigative abilities to discover incriminating evidence
and thereby induce a defendant to plead guilty. In rare instances, if a defendant is not forced to disclose evidence, he may
try to bluff the strength of his case, but it is highly improbable
that he would follow through and go to trial.
In summary, it is likely that nonreciprocal prosecutorial
discovery violates the Fifth Amendment, and that the state interests in prosecutorial discovery either are not urgent or can
be effectuated by means other than Rule 413 (c) and (d).
THE NEW RULES AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Even if prosecutorial discovery were deemed not to violate
the Fifth Amendment, a cogent argument can be presented that
it contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the committee comments, Rule 413 (d) is designed to eliminate surprise by allowing the prosecutor to ascertain the truth or falsity of defenses.' 0 ' The committee has
eschewed the issue of surprise to the defendant by failing to
provide for discovery of state rebuttal witnesses. 0 3 To determine the effect of this disparity in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the concept of due process must be examined.
Courts have adhered to the theory that due process "is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
100 Id.
101 ZAGEL & CARR, supra note 7, at 597-98.
102 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 413(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1971).

Committee

Comments provide:

The general justifications for discovery in criminal cases apply to discovery against the defense. Such discovery eliminates unfair surprise

and allows the opposing party to establish the truth or falsity of the
defense.
103 Doherty, supra note 70, at 546; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412 (a)
(i) (Smith-Hurd 1971). Committee Comments provide in part:
[This provision] enlarges upon the Code of Criminal Procedure

§ 114-9(a).

witnesses ...

In addition to requiring production of a list of intended
the State will also be expected to produce these witnesses'
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hearing ....1114 While these elements are essential, the concept
also encompasses rudimentary demands of justice in the treatment of the accused. In this regard, due process, while not
achieved solely by winning or losing at trial, is reflected by the
manner in which the trial is conducted. The majority opinion in
Brady v. Maryland expressed this sentiment eloquently:
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. 10 5
The Supreme Court, in accordance with this view, has been circumspect of state procedures which provide non-reciprocal benefits to the state, shifting the balance of forces so as to interfere
with the accused's ability to secure a fair trial.10 6
For example, in Washington v. Texas'-, the Court held that
a statute which prohibited persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime from testifying for one another,
violated the Sixth Amendment. 0 8 The Court noted in reaching
its decision that there was no similar bar to the state's use of
these same witnesses to prove its case. 10 9 The Court concluded
that as applied to the accused and the state, the statute operated
to preclude a fair trial. In Gideon v. Wainwright"' the Court
held that the accused was denied a fair trial because he was
indigent and was denied counsel.", Implicit in the Court's
holding was the recognition of the imbalance in financial resources between the indigent defendant and the State.
Until 1973 the Court had no occasion to definitively apply
this view to state criminal discovery schemes. Prior to this time
the Court, in dictum, obliquely suggested that its conclusions as
to the validity of certain notice defense statutes under the due
process-fair-trial standard might depend upon "an inquiry,
for example, into whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the State.". 2 This pronouncement, in Williams
v. Florida, was not definitive because the Florida discovery
scheme actually provided for reciprocal discovery of both the
witnesses the state planned to call in its case in chief and its
prior statements.

.

.

.

Nothing herein changes the types of material

that are to be provided; only the time of their disclosure is changed.
It is apparent from this comment that the Rules only modified Section
114-9 to require production of prior witnesses' statements and the time when
this production must be made. Section 114-9 remains unmodified in every
other respect so that rebuttal witnesses still cannot be discovered.
104 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
105 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
106 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, n. 6 (1973).
107 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
108 Id. at 17.
109 Id. at 23.
1i0 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

n1 Id. at 344.

112

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, n. 11 (1970).
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rebuttal witnesses.'" The worst effect of this statement was
its ambiguity; for the Court failed to clarify whether reciprocal
discovery against the state referred to either or both types of
witnesses.
The only Illinois case to consider the due process issue in
this context was People v. Holiday"4 where the court stated by
way of dictum:
Nevertheless, we do not feel that the discoverability of alibi-re-

buttal witnesses is an essential element of due process where the
defendant is otherwise accorded substantial discovery of prosecution witnesses.
alibi witness is
defendant. We
notice statute,

Indeed, the true parallel in the State's case to the
the eyewitness, who is readily discoverable by the
hold, therefore, that the requirements of the alibiconsidered in conjunction with the defendant's

discovery rights, are consonant with the fundamental-fairness-dueprocess concept. 1 5

At best, these decisions provided little guidance to sustain
an attack on discovery schemes as violative of due process. In
1973 the United States Supreme Court was presented with a fact
situation requiring a definitive, unambiguous pronouncement on
this issue. Because of his failure to comply with an Oregon
notice of alibi statute, Dale Wardius was forbidden to offer his
alibi defense and was subsequently convicted."16 The Oregon
statute provided for prosecutorial discovery of alibi witnesses,
17
1
but the accused was not afforded any discovery.
The Court emphasized the absence of a provision which required the state to reveal the names and addresses of witnesses
it planned to call to refute the alibi defense. As evidence of
their emphasis on the disparity in regard to rebuttal witnesses,
the majority stated:
Oregon grants no discovery rights to criminal defendants, and,
indeed, does not even provide defendants with bills of particulars.
More significantly, Oregon, unlike Florida, has no provision which
requires the State to reveal the names and
addresses of witnesses
118
it plans to use to refute an alibi defense.

This statement indicates that the flaw in the Oregon scheme was
particularly manifest in its treatment of rebuttal witnesses.
113 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220 (f) provides for the taking of discovery depositions by the defense. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 906.25 (Supp. 1971) provides
for discretionary discovery of prosecution witnesses' grand jury testimony. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(e) allows the defense to obtain a list of
prosecution witnesses provided the defense furnishes a list to the prosecution. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 allows the defense to discover the names and

addresses of prosecution rebuttal witnesses when the defendant is required
to comply with the notice of alibi requirements.
11447 Ill. 2d 300, 265 N.E.2d 634 (1970).
"5 Id. at 304, 265 N.E.2d at 636.

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 471-72 (1973).
17 Id. at 475.
18 Id. (emphasis added).

116
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The fact that no other discovery was afforded merely compounded the unfairness of the statute's operation.
The Court's emphasis on the lack of discoverability of rebuttal witnesses is borne out by the facts of the case as applied
to the concept of due process. Where a defendant is denied any
discovery, there is a nonreciprocal benefit which inures to the
state. This benefit shifts the balance of forces in favor of the
state and obstructs the fairness of trial in that the accused encounters a substantial risk of surprise by having every piece
of evidence in support of his defense refuted by a non-discoverable witness. The Court struck down the Oregon procedure as
being fundamentally unfair in terms of due process. The statute
in question involved an alibi defense, but since surprise at trial
is not unique to revelation of any particular defense, the due
process standard in Wardius should be applicable irrespective of
the type of defense disclosed. 119
An analysis of the Illinois Rules is somewhat hindered because the situation of an accused in Illinois is not as extreme as
that in Wardius. To evaluate the Illinois scheme in terms of due
process, it is necessary to examine the effect of defense discovery pursuant to Rule 412.120 If this provision enables the accused to secure a fair trial, due process is satisfied; otherwise
it is not.
The Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning in Holiday
indicates
what might be termed a lack of judicial realism. The court's
dictum is based on an assumption that the accused's opportunity
for discovery places him on a parity with the state. This reasoning is only theoretical since the defendant's right to discovery
may be nothing more than a judicially endorsed amenity. Even
assuming that the accused is afforded an opportunity to discover
the state's case, 12 1 there is nothing in the rules requiring state's
witnesses to speak to the accused or to his attorney. The rules
only prohibit counsel for either side from actively encouraging
19 Although the accused is subject to discovery pursuant to Rule 413 (d),
he has no opportunity to discover the state's rebuttal witnesses. This statement holds true for defenses other than insanity, incompetence, etc. It is
probable that if the accused must reveal these defenses, he will have an

opportunity to discover the state's rebuttal witnesses because Rule 412 (a) (iv)
allows the accused to discover reports or statements of experts made in
connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental
examinations. Discovery is not limited to those statements or reports the
state intends to use at trial and it is highly unlikely that the state will use
one expert prior to trial and a different expert at trial. Therefore, the
accused will discover rebuttal witnesses unless disclosure is denied pursuant
to Rule 412 I.
120ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412 (1971).
121 See note 46 supra concerning ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412 (i)
(1971).
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non-cooperation. 122

Certainly no one would be naive enough to
believe that witnesses closely allied with the prosecutor will
voluntarily cooperate for the sake of a fair trial. Even if the
witnesses resist discovery, the accused is still entitled to discover
their recorded statements.12 3 If there are no such statements in
existence, the accused is denied another avenue of discovery.
There is no mandatory recordation of grand jury testimony in
Illinois 2 4 nor is the accused entitled as of right to a free preliminary hearing transcript. 12' " Thus, the accused may often be
denied effectuation of his discovery right. Substantially verbatim memoranda reporting or summarizing oral conversations
are of little use to the accused because the inaccurate methods
of police reporting militate against the substantially verbatim
16
criteria.
If the Illinois Rules are examined in regard to the prosecution, there is an ostensible similarity in respect to the problems
encountered. This similarity is spurious because even if defense
witnesses refuse to cooperate and there are no statements
available, the state can always discover the defendant's witnesses
and the nature of his defense(s). This minimal knowledge is
capable of focusing the state's investigative power so that rebuttal evidence can be gathered. The accused, lacking the necessary
investigative resources, would find discovery of no value in a
similar situation. Restated, any discussion of discovery must
reckon with investigative abilities. This factor necessarily weighs
heavily in determining the balance of forces between the accused
and his accuser when the Illinois Rules are utilized.
If the theoretical right granted to the accused by Rule 412
cannot be effectuated, it is a mere token and the situation of the
accused in Illinois becomes identical to that of Mr. Wardius in
Oregon. The realities of defense discovery in Illinois do nothing
to adjust the balance of advantages in terms of the accused's
ability to secure a fair trial.
Thus far discussion of defense has been premised on the
tacit assumption that if the right granted by Rule 412 comes to
fruition, then somehow the accused will be afforded a fair trial
even without discovery of rebuttal witnesses. In Wardius the
court found this latter disparity "more significant" than the lack
of other discovery provisions in the Oregon Code. To determine
why the Court focused its attention on this aspect of the case,
122
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it is necessary to analyze the Illinois procedure in terms of the
inequity caused by this disparity and the rectification, if any,
provided by effectuation of discovery under Rule 412. In discussing the due process violation of the Oregon procedure the
Court held:
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to
the hazard of surprise concerning refutation
of the very pieces
127
of evidence which he disclosed to the State.
Similarly, surprise by undiscoverable rebuttal witnesses is inherent in the Illinois Rules. The ability of the accused to discover witnesses supportive of the state's case in chief would
protect against this surprise only if the defendant were able to
forestall the state from sustaining its burden of proof. If this
were accomplished, surprise would be eliminated in that it would
be unnecessary for the accused to present evidence to support
his defense. The likelihood that the accused would be granted
a directed verdict depends on a myriad of factors; for in a majority of cases, he would have to introduce evidence to support his
defense. To require due process to hinge on so speculative an
event would, in effect, render the due process clause a chimerical
mandate. If the actual ability to prevent surprise at trial pursuant to Rule 412 is so minimal, then the mere right to discovery
in this regard is equally ineffective. Further, if the opportunity
to obtain a directed verdict were deemed to satisfy due process,
then in reality due process could depend entirely upon either an
ineffective prosecutor or a diligent defense counsel. Courts have
stated that for purposes of due process "the focus must be on the
essential fairness of the procedure and not on the astuteness of
either counsel.' 128 It is probable that the majority in Wardius
emphasized the lack of discoverability of rebuttal witnesses because they realized that this paucity fostered surprise and
thereby prevented a fair trial. The tenor of the Court's opinion
indicates that the absence of other discovery provisions compounds the due process violation, while their presence relieves
the injustice without totally curing it.
THE NEW RULES AND SIXTH AMENDMENT

The previous sections have been concerned with the constitutionality of the enabling rules granting prosecutorial discovery. This section will be devoted to a discussion of the enforcement procedures which implement discovery. Rule 415 (g) (i)
states in relevant part:
If at any time during the course of the proceeding it is brought to
412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973) (emphasis added).
128 Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964).
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the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with
an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto,
the court may . . exclude such evidence ....129
The operation of this "preclusion sanction" is most devastating when applied to the defendant because it vitiates any
attempt to present a defense. The sanction is justified upon two
theories. First, the only effective means by which the state can
enforce pre-trial discovery is to punish the delinquent party."'
Second, the failure to comply with discovery makes the evidence
presumptively unworthy
of belief and this incompetence justifies
inadmissibility.- 1
The first theory views the preclusion sanction as an effective
punitive measure for enforcing pre-trial discovery. Because the
emphasis of this section concerns constitutionality, this theory
will be dealt with only briefly. In view of the drastic and
harmful consequences of the sanction when applied to the accused, various alternatives should be utilized if they are equally
as inexpensive and effective in deterring non-compliance 32 The
alternatives available under Rule 415(g) comply with these
criteria.' 33
The second theory gained credence in State ex rel. Simos v.
Burke.1
This case sustained the exclusion of evidence after the
defendant failed to comply with notice of alibi requirements. In
its ruling, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
What is constitutionally protected is the right of a defendant to
testify truthfully in his own behalf. . . These decisions, [prior
holdings by the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding the preclusion
sanction] and the statute on which they are based, do not limit
in any way the right of a defendant to testify truthfully in his own
behalf. The condition of prior notice as to alibi testimony, like
the test as to materiality and relevancy, does not invade the right
of a defendant to testify in his defense. 35
The presumption upon which the sanction operates was
tested by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v.
Texas.136 In a state murder trial defendant Washington desired
to have Fuller, who had already been convicted of the same crime,
testify that the accused had not participated in the killing.
Clearly this testimony was relevant and material to Washington's
defense. In spite of this, the trial court prevented Fuller from
testifying in reliance on a Texas statute prohibiting co-prin129
130

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 415(g) (i) (1971).
44 F.R.D. 481, 488 (1967).

131 State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 137-38, 163 N.W.2d
177, 181 (1968).
132 Comment, The Preclusion Sanction A Violation of the Constitutional Right To Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342, 1356 (1972).
133 Id. at 1356-60.
18441 Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).
135 Id. at 137-38, 163 N.W.2d'at 181 (emphasis added).
136 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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cipals from testifying in each other's behalf. ' -7 The statute,
like the Illinois preclusion sanction, created an irrebuttable
presumption that certain evidence was incompetent because it
was untruthful. The court held that the statute violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to "compulsory process." On the
surface, this ruling seems erroneous because "compulsory process" literally speaks of the right to obtain witnesses 1 3 8 and the
statute in question did not prevent this, but only barred the
accused from examining his witnesses. 1 39 Nevertheless, Justice
Warren held that the accused was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process because he was unable to present
testimony relevant to his defense in the form of competent wit40
In so holding, the Court first established that the right
nesses.'
to "compulsory process" epitomized the right to present a defense:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
This right is a fundamental element of due process
defense 4....
of law.' '
This conclusion was the result of Justice Warren's extrapolation from the literal terms of the Sixth Amendment. To accomplish this task, the Court examined the historical purpose of
the Sixth Amendment and the intention of the framers of the
Constitution.
At common law there were numerous restrictions on defense witnesses who were physically and mentally capable of
testifying. The restrictions took the form of disqualification
based on interest. The unstated premise of this disqualification
was that:
the right to present witnesses was subordinate to the court's
interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were
best avoided by preventing the jury from hearing any testimony
that might be perjured ....142
Id. at 17.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that the accused shall "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ..
139Tex. Penal Code, Art. 82 and Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 711
provides:
Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in
the same or different indictments, can not be introduced as witnesses
for one another, but they may claim a severance, and if one or more
be acquitted they may testify in behalf of the others.
137

138

Tex. Penal Code, Art. 82:
Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in
the same or different indictments, can not be introduced as witnesses
by one another, but they may claim a severance; and if any one or
more be acquitted, or the prosecution against them be dismissed, they
may testify in behalf of the others.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 711 (1925).
140Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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In 1918 the case of Rosen v. United States,143 decided on non-

constitutional grounds, held that the truth could be more readily
arrived at by hearing the relevant testimony of all competent
persons involved in a case. The issue of credit and weight of
such testimony was to be determined by the court or jury. 4 4 In
concluding that the reasoning of Rosen was required by the
Sixth Amendment, Justice Warren also relied on United States
v. Reid.145 Reid expressly recognized that the Sixth Amendment
was designed to abrogate common law rules which refused to
allow the accused in criminal cases to present witnesses in his
defense. This analysis was further bolstered by the fact that
"the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the
futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."' 6
After finding that the defendant had a right to examine his
witnesses, the Court sought to afford some protection against
their arbitrary exclusion based on statutory disqualification. In
this regard the Court stated:
[I]t could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the
clause [compulsory process] if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law. It is difficult to see how the
Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that prevent
whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis
of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.147
In Washington the Court did not rule against the usual
evidentiary requirements of testimony, but held only that exclusion of otherwise qualified evidence based upon an irrebut148
table presumption of untrustworthiness was unconstitutional.
The focus of the Court's attack on the statute was well grounded
if the American system of justice is to retain its adversary
character. This goal can only be achieved if the criminal trial
is a forum whereby both the accused and the state have an
equal opportunity to present material and relevant testimony.
The risk of false testimony cannot justify keeping otherwise
relevant testimony from the jury because "our adversary system
reposes judgment of the credibility of all witnesses in the jury2. 4
In addition to this safeguard, cross-examination and sanctions
for perjury are available to prevent false testimony.
A literal reading of the Sixth Amendment indicates that
it is couched in terms of compelling the attendance of wit143 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
144 Id. at 471.
145 54 U.S. (12 How.) 180
146
147
148

149

(1852).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22, n. 21.
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972).
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nesses." ° A strict application of this clause would seem to exclude documentary and tangible evidence from the right to
present a defense. To interpret this right in terms of form
rather than substance is to ignore reality and water down the
protection. For these reasons the right to present a defense
should not be limited to testimonial evidence. Furthermore,
there is authority to support the contention that the right encompasses both documentary and tangible evidence. In regard
to documentary evidence, John Marshall, in United States v.
Burr,"' was presented with the issue of whether a subpoena
duces tecum should issue to President Jefferson to compel
production of a letter relevant to Burr's defense. Justice
Marshall stated:
This court would certainly be very unwilling to say that upon fair
construction the constitutional and legal right to obtain its process,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, does not extend to their
bringing with them such papers as may be material in the defence.
The literal distinction which exists between the cases is too much
attenuated to15 be
countenanced in the tribunals of a just and hu2
mane nation.
With respect to its testimonial character, there is greater
disparity between tangible evidence and witnesses than between
documents and witnesses. Chief Justice Warren's language in
Washington would indicate that the right to present a defense
includes tangible evidence:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as
well as the15 3 prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies.
In light of the language involving "the defendant's version of
the facts" it would seem that tangible evidence could be included in "facts" relevant to the accused's defense. Very often
a weapon or an article of clothing is useful to a defense and
these items are just as much a part of the "facts" as is witness
testimony.
The Court in Washington was not merely concerned with
the common law disqualification aspect of the statute. This is
evident from the frequent use of the word "presumed" in connection with "untrustworthiness." While Chief Justice Warren
left this facet of the case unenunciated, it is relevant to the
discussion to examine the rationality of this presumption of
untrustworthiness in light of the preclusion sanction. In order
to proceed, the burden of proof necessary to overcome the pre15o Note 138 supra.

1"125 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807).
52Id. at 35.
53

388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (emphasis added).

392

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 7:364

sumption of "untrustworthiness" must be considered.5 4 The
greater the burden, the stronger the rational connection must
be between the proven fact and the presumed fact. 155 In the case
of an irrebuttable presumption, which cannot be overcome by
any proof, there should be an almost perfect correlation between
these facts. Applying this supposition to an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness, it follows that there should be
an almost perfect correlation between the class of evidence excluded and the assumption that such evidence is false. In determining the strength of this rational connection, it is relevant
and appropriate to examine the reasons which might cause a
defendant to withhold such evidence.
The defendant might withhold information because he
wants to surprise the prosecutor at trial. A second consideration
might be that he fears intimidation of his witnesses through offers of immunity or threats of prosecution. Defendants might
wish to protect the privacy of their witnesses or their relationships with them. The accused may feel that any undisclosed
witness will commit perjury. Finally, the accused's friendship
with a witness may also promote perjury if there is nondisclosure. Certainly any irrebuttable presumption based on moral
incapacity or witness interest would fall within the common law
disqualifications described in Washington.15 6 The other considerations simply do not approach the high degree of correlation
necessary to support an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness.
In summary, the preclusion sanction embodied by Rule
415 (g) is based on an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness which is arbitrary and therefore violates the defendant's right to present a defense.
Advocates of prosecutorial discovery contend that the irrebuttable presumption involved in enforcement is justified by
compelling state interests and, therefore, that infringement of
Sixth Amendment rights is justified. As discussed in the section
dealing with the Fifth Amendment, such an infringement can
be justified only if these interests are urgent and there are no
viable alternatives for effectuating them. By virtue of the fact
that the preclusion sanction is a means of enforcing pre-trial
discovery, the state interests served and the available alternatives are identical to those considered in connection with the
Fifth Amendment. Therefore, as with the Fifth Amendment,
the state interests are either not sufficiently urgent or they
154 Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process
in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 184-86 (1969).
155
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can be effectuated by means other than pre-trial discovery. In
effect, the irrebuttable presumption of the preclusion sanction
cannot be justified and, thus, the sanction itself violates the
Sixth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

James J. Doherty adequately expressed the effect of Rule
413 as "A Requiem to the Accusatorial System."15
The approach of the Illinois Rules Committee and the United States
Supreme Court would seem to afford credence to his statement.
Further, prosecutorial discovery is in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's previously expressed sentiment that the Fifth
Amendment is the essential mainstay'5 8 of the American system
of criminal justice. This article has attempted to uncover the
fallacies which have lead to a dilution of the self-incrimination
privilege and consequent subjugation rights of the accused.
If the Illinois Rules regarding prosecutorial discovery are
defective constitutionally, there remains the question of whether
criminal discovery can survive as a one-way street. The mainstay of prosecutorial discovery is the mutuality argument. The
same reasons that are advocated as merits for defense discovery
apply to the merits of prosecutorial discovery. Any argument
for prosecutorial discovery based on mutuality ignores the fact
that the accused has always had certain advantages not afforded
to the state. As Justice Peters pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County,159 the
presumption of innocence and the Fifth Amendment militate
against the mutuality concept. 160 Critics of the one-way street
theory argue that defense discovery does not merely redress
certain advantages of the state, but tilts the scale so that the
balance of advantages lies with the accused. The weakness of
this plea becomes apparent when the advantages of the accused
and the state are compared. Besides greater financial and staff
resources with which to investigate and analyze evidence, the
prosecutor has certain tactical advantages. The state begins its
investigation shortly after the crime, when it is more likely that
physical evidence will be found and witnesses will be apt to remember events. The accused begins his investigation only after
the state has gathered most of this evidence. Even if the accused
can remember certain witnesses, generally they have been advised
not to speak to anyone. Further, the state can compel witness
157

Doherty, supra note 70.

1-8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
159 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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cooperation,while the accused cannot. Even without this ability,
the state, by virtue of its respected position in the community,
engenders cooperation. An indigent defendant is totally overshadowed in this regard. If the accused has been arrested, he
can be questioned and searched. While in custody, he can be
forced to participate in certain non-tdstimonial activities where
he becomes the source of physical evidence. The accused is
supposed to be protected by the preliminary hearing and by the
grand jury, but in reality these procedures are extensions of the
prosecution. If these advantages inure to the state without
discovery, one must ponder the added effect of prosecutorial
discovery. Even without discovery, the balance of advantages
remains with the state and, rather than upsetting this balance,
defense discovery tends to equalize it.
In conclusion, prosecutorial discovery in Illinois effectively
places the accused at the total mercy of the state. The road to
improvement of the system of criminal justice can be found not
by arming the state with added advantages, but by maintaining
the status quo while the defendant's position is equalized. Defense discovery is an effective step toward this equalization.
P. Scott Courtin

